In part two of my argument against Libertarian freedom, I ask permission to regurgitate a rather profound argument offered by Jonathan Edwards in his previously mentioned Freedom of the Will.
Essentially, Libertarians argue that their particular form of freedom is necessary in order for someone to be punished and or rewarded. They say that if the causation of their actions did not arise from a Libertarian context (i.e. without necessary causation preceding its occurrence), then the act was not done freely; and if the act was not done freely (so the reasoning goes) then their acts cannot be judged.
Edwards argues by turning this idea on its head: if volitions must be uncaused in order for one to be worthy of praise or blame, then it is the Libertarian system which actually makes praise or blame impossible. This is because, in the Compatiblistic schema, people are judged because their actions arise from their nature. But if actions arise from an uncaused volition, then the nature of the criminal can not be brought into question. After all, their nature was not the sufficient cause of their actions.
The legal system puts this notion into practice. Part of the reason we send violent criminals away (in many cases) for life is that they are the types of people whose natures are such that they are believed capable of killing or harming others again. When people do bad things, in other words, we take it for granted that this is because they are bad people. Their natures are such that their proclivity to kill may again result in harm being done. We make an assumption of the truth of this in everyday life. Now, if the legal system proceeded in a Libertarian fashion, every action would be assessed on its own merits (which should certainly be done), but without a view to future harm the individual is believed fully capable of. If the individual's nature does not sufficiently determine their actions, we are not even justified in assessing a moral value to the person's actions, precisely because said actions did not necessarily arise from their nature.
If this line of argumentation is valid, then given the notion of Libertarian freedom, it is impossible to assign a moral value to anyone's actions. This is again another example of how Libertarian freedom is an incoherent version of freedom. I again offer up that the Compatiblistic notion of freedom is not only coherent, but that in contrast to the Libertarian system of freedom, it is most evident from reason as well as the Scriptures (examined in Part 1 of this blog series).
If Heretic responds with, "In your example, the violent criminal is put away so he stops hurting people, but who will stop God from hurting everyone!?" I will know that my argument went right over his head.
ReplyDeleteWell done. I'm enjoying this series.
ReplyDeleteI've tried to listen to mp3s of Edwards' "Freedom...", and although I recognize his arguments in your post, I didn't understand them until now. I think I need to read him, so that I can reread and reread and...
Again, well done. You must be one of those Central Kansas intellectuals I've heard about. (I grew up near Potwin--none there.)
I think that listening to MP3s of someone read Freedom of the Will would be on par with listening to the constitution being read. Quite simply, little of it would register. If it wasn't for Edwards' helpful headings and the fact that you can read his arguments multiple times until you get them, I probably wouldn't have understood ANY of the book.
ReplyDeleteThis comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteIs this a blog or a doctoral dissertation?
ReplyDeleteWhat's that? It's a blog? Oh, okay. I guess we'll keep the blog posts under 10,000 words. Sorry, Andrew. What you're looking for is probably found in a philosophy journal.
By the way, this isn't exactly meant to be comprehensive. I know a lot of people who don't even know what compatiblistic freedom means, so to expect such an extraordinary level of detail is a bit of a stretch.
Besides, you're right. I have no idea who Fischer or Frankfurt even are. I have Edwards' book in my library, and I don't have those other guys', so sorry, I read what I have on the shelf.
"I actually find this presentation, well, lacking..." "I find the treatment so far; well, inadequate." You couldn't sound more smug. Again, perhaps you're looking for a book. This is a blog.
I don't mean to be so defensive, but you're asking for filet mingon and all I have is ground beef.
I apologize for sounding smug. That was not my intention and I hope I did not offend you. Perhaps I was wrong to express my perception so freely and expect such a high standard. I am glad you are writing on compatiblism and I'm sure it will help many. I just suppose there is a tendency in reformed circles to spend so much time in the Reformation and Puritan period that we neglect the issues of our own day. So maybe I was a bit over zealous in my remarks. I apologize for that. I understand the limitations of a blog post, but just saw a treatment of compatiblism looking a bit different in my mind.
ReplyDeleteGod bless.
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteI also deleted my comment so as not to cause any confusion.
ReplyDeleteYou know what, Andrew; I think you're a good guy who means well. I was way too defensive in response to your post, and I apologize.
ReplyDeleteI did want to interact with your perfectly valid point about Reformed thinkers preferring to stay in the 17th and 18th Century. I think there's a certain level of truth to that, but it may largely come down to preference. I have my bachelors' in Philosophy, and so you would think I would be able to follow what you have said, but the truth is, my philosophy degree is for the purpose of helping me to think accurately about God. The telos of my degree is personal growth (or to use Edwards' term, "the improvement of the soul"). As such, I really only go so far into the deeper minutae of discussions like these. I only think about these issues as far as my interests extend, and so that means that if no one tells me about this modern discussion of semi-compatiblism, then I won't know anything about them.
You can probably tell, as well, by reading all three parts of my post about compatiblism that my interests are more theological than they are philosophical (in any technical sense). Philosophy is but a tool to aid us in my theological discussion, so I try to keep things as simple and clear as I can. What I'm really trying to say is, academics have their place and their role (I often wish I could be one of them), but I want to minister to the common man who may have a few misgivings about Reformed theology.
So when I call parts 2 and 3 of my discussion "philosophical," perhaps we would all be better served if I clarified that I believe compatiblism to be clearly derived from the use of reason as opposed to revelation. Most of the time, I use the word "philosophy" as a substitute for the word "reason."
This brings me full circle, now. The reason I personally read the older Reformers such as Edwards, Calvin, Luther, et al is that these theologians were interested in the deep things of God, but always for the purpose of personal devotion or growth of the soul. There are moderns who do this, too (John Piper comes to mind, though I know there are more), but even then, my interests are far more oriented towards theology than philosophy. But I have found some of the modern philosophical debates within Christian circles to be quite dry, uninteresting, and excessive in their dissection of many subjects (these discussions of semi-compatiblism, for example, would definitely fall outside of the realm of my own interests).
This whole three part series arose from a discussion I was having with The Heretic - a regular to this blog. He, however, has yet to interact with what I think you will agree, Andrew, are very simplistic arguments I am setting forth here. He continually attacks the Calvinistic viewpoint asserting libertarian freedom, but he has never, ever, defended his libertarian viewpoint. He assumes it, because that is his tradition, and he doesn't know how to think in any other way.
These blog posts were intended to demonstrate for The Heretic that I don't merely assume compatiblism, but that I have reasons for believing it to be far superior to any other philosophical notion of freedom. I do believe I have done what I set out to do with these posts, but you are right when you point out that I am only scratching the surface of this subject.
By the way, I would be delighted if you could post some links that might point those interested in the direction of a fuller treatment of this subject (preferably available online in some way). Thanks for being so polite, and let me say that you didn't have to delete your comments. I could have done that if their simple removal is what I wanted.
"Essentially, Libertarians argue that their particular form of freedom is necessary in order for someone to be punished and or rewarded. They say that if the causation of their actions did not arise from a Libertarian context (i.e. without necessary causation preceding its occurrence), then the act was not done freely; and if the act was not done freely (so the reasoning goes) then their acts cannot be judged."
ReplyDeleteJust to keep from confusion, libertarians do not believe that you CANNOT punish someone for something that they did not freely choose... but only that you cannot JUSTLY punish someone for something that they did not freely choose.
"This is because, in the Compatiblistic schema, people are judged because their actions arise from their nature. But if actions arise from an uncaused volition, then the nature of the criminal can not be brought into question."
How is that a problem?! Why would the law punish people for their "nature"? If that's the case why even wait for them to commit a crime? Why not punish them before they have a chance to commit it? For instance, let's say you can somehow determine with certainty that a person will commit a crime in the future. Is it acceptable to punish them now? Apparently you would have to answer in the affirmative. I would say such a thing is unjust. The law ought not punish natures, but rather ought to punish INDIVIDUALS for freely choosing certain actions.
"Part of the reason we send violent criminals away (in many cases) for life is that they are the types of people whose natures are such that they are believed capable of killing or harming others again. When people do bad things, in other words, we take it for granted that this is because they are bad people. Their natures are such that their proclivity to kill may again result in harm being done. We make an assumption of the truth of this in everyday life. "
If that is true... then our legal system is inherantly unjust. Fortunately we don't put people away because they are the KIND of people that would tend to commit crimes... but because they IN FACT COMMITTED CRIMES. You act as if certain people have tendencies that the law should punish or seek to cure, as if you were trying to cure a disease. Since we're bringing in outside quotes, I have a couple for you. Here are a few lines from C.S. Lewis's "The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment",
LEWIS: "It is only as deserved or undeserved that a sentence can be just or unjust... thus when we cease to consider what the criminal deserves and conisder only what will cure him or deter others, we have tacitly removed him from the sphere of justice altogether; instead of a person, a subject of rights, we now have a mere object, a patient, a case... the punishment of an innocent, that is, an underserving, man is wicked only if we grant the traditional view that righteous punishment means deserved punishment...to be cured against one's will and cured of states which we may not regard as disease is to be put on a level with those who have not yet reached the age of reason or those who never will; to be classed with infants, imbeciles, and domestic animals. But to be punished, however severely because we deserved it, because we 'ought to have known better', is to be treated as a human person made in God's image."
ADAM: "If the individual's nature does not sufficiently determine their actions, we are not even justified in assessing a moral value to the person's actions, precisely because said actions did not necessarily arise from their nature."
Actions do not need to be derived from a person's nature to be immoral. They simply need to be of a certain classification of actions that are objectively immoral, in order to be such. The immorality of actions has nothing to do with nature of an individual person.
I am really surprised that someone would disagree with what I'm saying here (I mean, I know that you have to in order for your worldview to be defended, but it still surprises me to see it in writing). The criminal is being punished for his crime, but not exclusively so. He is also being removed from the community because he is a danger to the others in the community. Now, a person's nature can be changed, and rehabilitation is possible, I think, but that is not being contested here.
ReplyDelete"Fortunately we don't put people away because they are the KIND of people that would tend to commit crimes... but because they IN FACT COMMITTED CRIMES. You act as if certain people have tendencies that the law should punish or seek to cure, as if you were trying to cure a disease."
Tell that to my wife. She works at the YMCA and has to become familiar with a whole book full of convicted sex offenders who live in our town. She has to memorize their faces because none of them are allowed to enter the YMCA because there are children there. When you find out that a neighbor of yours is a convicted child molester, lets see how much trust you put in his free will. Will you ask him to babysit your ten year old daughter? I doubt it. Because you know, against your philosophy, that the pedophile's nature is determinate of his actions.
And even if you are willing to take the insane step of letting him babysit for you in order to be faithful to your commitment in free will, you still have to acknowledge that average people don't look at crime & punishment in that way. When someone murders a person or harms a child, we put them away as punishment for their crime and to keep them from committing this crime again. We do this for the safety of the community, for the good of our children, and even for the good of the criminal in hopes that his nature can be changed and society can be bettered because of it. We presuppose in our justice system that his person's nature is determinate to his actions, and we hope that his nature will be changed through various methods of rehabilitation.
The commission of the crime itself must be seen as a crime, of course, but the fact that the criminal did this evil thing also shows us that we have a person who is "badly damaged about the head" (Melville). Again, this is why you would never be comfortable letting the convicted pedophile babysit for you (in fact, I'm pretty sure there are laws against it!).
This whole discussion you're having about punishing people in advance is a little foreign to me. I mean, God does not punish people for sins they will commit, only for sins they have committed. Why should we be any different? And besides, we have no way of knowing what anyone will do in the future. Because we're not God.
To begin with, let me say that Heretic's distinction is quite meaningless regarding whether a libertrian agent CAN be judged for their actions. Such a distinction never enters the professional academic debate. Obviously, Adam intends to say judged justly.
ReplyDeleteI would, nevertheless, have to agree that we don't punish people because they have a certain nature, but because of the expression of their volition in actions. However, I think Adam's underlying assumption is, in fact, correct--contra Heretic. While we do not punish people for their nature, motive is a huge part of assessing the grounds for punishment. If we can establish motive, then that is an important part of a criminal case against a person. If not, then it is harder to convict them. In other words, there has to be a traceable course from the action back to a desire for the action within the agent. The entire legal system, therefore, does seem to assume compatibilism, as Adam suggests. This is because compatiblism is far more intuitive, I think, than libertarianism in terms of grounding moral responsibility.
Another legal example that refutes libertarianism and shows the philosophical superiority of compatiblism to libertarianism is often referred to as a Frankfurt-type counterexample to libertarian freedom, named after its found Harry Frankfurt. The example basically shows that a criminal could be held accountable for his actions in today's courts even if he did not have alternative possibilities (i.e. it critiques PAP).
The example goes like this. Jones wants to kill Mayor Matt. So does a mad scientist, named Black. So, Black plants a mircochip in Jone's head that allows him, the mad scientist, to monotor Jones's behavior. Black can tell, through this monitor, if Black is going to go through with killing Mayor Matt or not. If for whatever reason, Jones decides not to kill Mayor Matt at any point in time, Black will interfere and make Jones kill Mayor Matt. The time comes for Jones to kill the mayor and he fully executes his desires. He kills the mayor of his own desire and volition. Black does not have to interfere. If Jones had, at some point, decided not to kill the mayor, Black would have interfered with his neuronal activity and made him kill the mayor. But he didn't. In any case, alternative possibilities are shut down. Jones cannot do otherwise than kill the mayor. Yet, when the case is taken to court, Jones is still guilty. Why? Because he acted as he desired, even though he could not do otherwise.
This example, as most philosophers agree (few modern philosophers actually buy libertarianism), illustrates the fact that libertarian freedom (based upon the principle of alternative possibilities) is not necessary to ground moral responsibility. All that is needed is compatibilism. And that form of freedom is perfectly consistent with Ephesians 1:11, which says God predetermines all things.
"The criminal is being punished for his crime, but not exclusively so. He is also being removed from the community because he is a danger to the others in the community. Now, a person's nature can be changed, and rehabilitation is possible, I think, but that is not being contested here."
ReplyDeleteThe problem is that being punished because one deserves it, and being punished for the well being of the community are not completely consistent. At some point the two conflict with one another, and at that point you need to choose whether you're going to punish because a person deserves it, or because it's what is best for the community. Certainly, punishing because a person deserves it is also often what is best for the community, but that doesn't give you an excuse to ignore the fundamental distinction between the two. At some point punishing or not punishing because a person deserves or not deserves it will have an adverse affect on the community.
"Tell that to my wife. She works at the YMCA and has to become familiar with a whole book full of convicted sex offenders who live in our town. She has to memorize their faces because none of them are allowed to enter the YMCA because there are children there. When you find out that a neighbor of yours is a convicted child molester, lets see how much trust you put in his free will. Will you ask him to babysit your ten year old daughter? I doubt it. Because you know, against your philosophy, that the pedophile's nature is determinate of his actions."
Tell that to your wife? Ok... Adam's wife... we shouldn't punish someone because it benefits the community, we should punish them because they deserve it. Yes yes, I understand that there are pedophiles out there... what does this have to do with anything? I'm arguging that people ought to be punished for their actions, so you accuse me of allowing pedophiles to run free? What? Come on, lets not start throwing up straw men.
"Because you know, against your philosophy, that the pedophile's nature is determinate of his actions."
No I don't know that and if I did it would be unjust to punish him. What I do believe is that once a person has proved themselves unworthy of my trust I no longer have to give it to them. So, of course its absurd that you would imply that I would let a pedophile watch a little kid. Libertarian free will does not assume that people are GOOD, it only assumes that they are not evil. It assumes that they freey do good or evil. Don't assume that because I believe in libertarian free will, that I believe everyone ought to be trusted. This is a completely pointless discussion, and we shouldn't even be having it. You're obviously running out of arguments that libertarianism is "incoherant" because the types of things you are throwing out now are borderline ad hominem.
"When someone murders a person or harms a child, we put them away as punishment for their crime and to keep them from committing this crime again. We do this for the safety of the community, for the good of our children, and even for the good of the criminal in hopes that his nature can be changed and society can be bettered because of it."
No. We put someone away because they deserve it. The fact that the manner in which we punish often also has a secondary effect of protecting the community is a nice bonus, but you should never assume that it takes precedence of justice or that it is on the same footing with it, as if this protection of the communiy were somehow an actual reason for the punishment.
"The commission of the crime itself must be seen as a crime..."
Why? Why is this necessary? If we can punish people for being "badly damages about the head" why require that they commit a crime in the first place. This is why I brought up the question of whether you would punish before the fact if you knew a person would inevitably commit a crime... which of course you gave the inherantly anti-intellectual answer to... duh we can't do that duh.... i mean come on are you serious? Bachelor's degree in philosophy and the answer you give to a hypothetical scenario is... that's a hypothetical scenario? Is that because you know if you analyze the scenario it will reveal the injustice of your position? (Also the fact that God punishes people after the fact works against your position, becasuse one usually infers that God does so because the commission of the crime is actually necessary for the punishment to be just.)
By the way this is really not even a discussion of libertarian free will v. compatibalism. It has turned into a debate over deontology v. utilitarianism, and you've taken the utilitarian perspective. But I'm not sure that libertarianism/compatibalism inherantly lend to either view.
I note that Heretic failed to respond to any of my arguments against libertarianism or those I put forward for compatibilism. Hummm... Certainly that is germane to the free will debate, not as much ethics. Although, responsibility theory is very much related and that has significant intersections with ethical theory.
ReplyDelete"Don't assume that because I believe in libertarian free will, that I believe everyone ought to be trusted. You're obviously running out of arguments that libertarianism is 'incoherant' because the types of things you are throwing out now are borderline ad hominem."
ReplyDeleteNow you're trying to spin this discussion to make youself a victim. You're missing what I'm really saying here. Given libertarian free will, if someone has done something (say, for the sake of continuity it's pedophilia), it is equally possible that they will do it again or that they will not do it again. What I'm arguing here is a real world example which you clearly don't like (I think because it shows, plain as day, that our natures are determinate of our actions), and even if your philosophy says one thing, your actions and real world application betrays your philosophy of libertarianism. If someone betrays your trust, why don't you trust them anymore? Could it be because they are a liar and have such a nature that they are likely to lie again? Or could it be that you don't trust the pedophile because he has done something wicked which we know he is likely to do again?
Even if your philosophy demands that we view each person's actions as not being sufficiently determined by their nature, I'm showing that you and I don't apply such academic notions. We know that actions do not arise spontaneously and arbitrarily. We know that the creep who does these things to children does them because something in his nature is twisted and evil, and because we believe that nature determines actions, we protect our children from them.
This is not a grasping at straws.
"so you accuse me of allowing pedophiles to run free? What? Come on"
I never said that. I said that if libertarianism were consistent, people would not be punished, because they have no natures which make them guilty. Intention is important to knowing if a crime is committed (see Andrew's discussion). If someone has no intention to commit a crime, we punish very differently (just look at the distinction between first degree murder and manslaughter).
"This is why I brought up the question of whether you would punish before the fact if you knew a person would inevitably commit a crime... which of course you gave the inherantly anti-intellectual answer to... duh we can't do that duh.... i mean come on are you serious? Bachelor's degree in philosophy and the answer you give to a hypothetical scenario is... that's a hypothetical scenario? Is that because you know if you analyze the scenario it will reveal the injustice of your position?"
Who's being ad hominem now?
My response was really that God only punishes after the fact and that he does not punish for future sins. That's not intellectually dishonest. It's Biblically informed. This hypothetical scenario about punishing future sins doesn't make sense to me, to be quite honest. It just doesn't seem relevant. Besides, I didn't dodge the question, I answered that no, we should not punish people for things that they will do (assuming we know it). We wait until they commit a crime to punish them. So what's... duh... durrr... so wrong with that? And again, let me remind you that what you said about me here is far more offensive and ad hominem than my discussion of the pedophile from earlier.
"Also the fact that God punishes people after the fact works against your position, becasuse one usually infers that God does so because the commission of the crime is actually necessary for the punishment to be just."
How does that work against my position? My position is not that God punishes in advance, but rather, that God punishes after the fact. And also, that the reason we do the evil thing which God is punishing is that our natures are evil and bent towards destruction. If our natures were good and inclined to love God, that is what we would do.
I note again that Heretic has failed to respond to my post (after some time now), directly attacking his position and defending compatibilism. I don't think he has an answer for the issues I raise. What else shall we make of the fact that he refuses to engage?
ReplyDeleteIf I had to guess (and be charitable), I might surmise that he is trying to stay pointed and engaged with my discussion. However, Heretic, if you are reading this, deal with Andrew's discussion now, since you and I are just going in circles.
ReplyDelete"I note that Heretic failed to respond to any of my arguments against libertarianism or those I put forward for compatibilism. Hummm... Certainly that is germane to the free will debate, not as much ethics. Although, responsibility theory is very much related and that has significant intersections with ethical theory."
ReplyDeleteSorry I don't spend every waking minute of my life on here. (Not that I don't want to. This site is awesome! Bring the Books baby!) Seriously though, I try to put in my two cents when I can, but it usually involves me checking this 20 minutes before a class once every two weeks, so you'll have to have some patience with me.
"However, I think Adam's underlying assumption is, in fact, correct--contra Heretic. While we do not punish people for their nature, motive is a huge part of assessing the grounds for punishment. If we can establish motive, then that is an important part of a criminal case against a person. If not, then it is harder to convict them. In other words, there has to be a traceable course from the action back to a desire for the action within the agent. The entire legal system, therefore, does seem to assume compatibilism, as Adam suggests. This is because compatiblism is far more intuitive, I think, than libertarianism in terms of grounding moral responsibility."
Motive is not sufficient to punish a person for a crime. The fact that the law does not assume that if a motive is proved, then a crime is proved actually works against the idea that the law ought to punish people for their natures, rather than working in its favor... because this utilitarian idea(at least as Adam has so presented it) tends to imply that if motive is present then an actual crime is unnecessary to carry out the punishment.
My deontological view of the criminal law on the other hand explictly requires more than mere motive. In fact it only finds motive relevant as an evidential factor to be used in determining if an actual crime was committed. If a crime can be shown by other means, motive does not even enter the picture... and this is reflected in the law. (Example: If you have a video of a crime, you don't really need to establish a motive to prove the crime. You only need to establish a motive when you have more circumstantial evidence.)
The point of all this however, is that Adam's compatibalistic statements do not sync with the common conception of the law. Adam asserts that as long as a person has a "choice" between two forms of coercion he chooses freely. So for instance, if a woman is held at gun point and raped... Adam would say that this was not rape but consensual sex... because the woman could have freely chosen not to have sex and opt instead for death. Libertarianism on the other hand calls this what it is. Coercion. Neither choice is a free choice, because of the element of coercion. The woman did not freely choose between being murdered and being raped... the woman was coerced into having sex, the woman was FORCED to have sex, and there was no FREEDOM of choice involved. The law reflects this distinction. The law reflects libertarian free will. Compatibalism is inconsistent with these principles; compatibalism leads to RADICALLY different results when taken to the logical implications of the philosophy. I'm not claiming this is incoherant. Just wrong. (Although if you want to hold to the idea that rape is NOT consensual sex then you cannot also claim to be a compatibalist... so holding to BOTH of these theories would be an inconsistency.)
hi heretic,
ReplyDeletethanks for responding.
A few things. First, I agree that motive on its own is not enough. I said that could be an important "part" of a criminal case against a person, not that it was necessary, etc. So I am in agreement there, but don't see how it effects my argument. My point was simply that since motive forms part of such a case, it illustrates the assumption that desires and actions are linked. I think that point stands. Second, I'd like to move away from Adam's essentially hierarchial compatiblist account since I don't identify with that position would be more of a semi-compatiblist. Third, the issue between libertarianism and compatibilism is whether a desire-based rather than alternative-based account of freedom is compatible with moral responsibility. Let's focus on that issue. The essence of my post focused on this question, which you failed to respond to. It was centered around the Frankfurt example, which illustrates the computability of moral responsibility and determinism. This is the main issue of the debate and the one my post focused on. How do you respond to that argument?
"So for instance, if a woman is held at gun point and raped... Adam would say that this was not rape but consensual sex... because the woman could have freely chosen not to have sex and opt instead for death."
ReplyDeleteThat's a clever tactic, Heretic; trying to get me to use profanity in my response, thereby degrading my credibility. Nice try.
We discussed this before, and you tried to do this before. I asked for an example of a time when someone does something that they don't want to do at a given moment. I think (my memory's hazy) that I charitably offered the example of someone being "forced" to do something with a gun to their head. I then showed how even though the person's options in the illustration have been limited, they are even then still choosing between two options, one which they prefer over the other. Simply because their options are limited to death or idealism, they may still freely choose between the two.
NOW pay attention: this is an illustration only of the fact that even if one doesn't like the options presented, one always has options. It is NOT analagous to God's sovereignty over human action! This has to be true in order for your horrible rape straw-man to stand, but it isn't true. I have long insisted that God's sovereignty has no analogy in human experience. There is nothing in our experience over which we are sovereign in the same way that God is sovereign. There is a vertical relationship between God and His creation, but any analogy we try and present to illustrate this will be a horizontal relationship.
"Adam would say that this was not rape but consensual sex." No I wouldn't. You make my mischaracterizations seem tame by comparison. What a misrepresentation. You're starting to sound like the guy who's grasping at straws, here. You're offensive, and you have ignored our previous discussion of this issue. I would venture to guess, on purpose, since I certainly didn't forget.